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Metacognition refers to the critical awareness of or ability to monitor, regulate,
control, and sequence of one's thoughts and performance. There is limited research that
examines the relationship between metacognition and (a) academic performance and (b)
general cognition among undergraduates. Moreover, there is an even greater paucity of
literature that focuses more specifically on undergraduate biology students’ neural
activity in relation to their metacognition.
This study aimed to examine the relationship between undergraduate life sciences
students' metacognitive calibration, i.e., their capacity to self-evaluate their own
performance, and their behavioral performance and brain activity during a biological
error reasoning task. Thirty-four undergraduate students (Mage= 19.47, 85% female) from
a Midwestern university completed a model reasoning task during functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Two distinct groups of students with individual differences—
Calibrated and Non-Calibrated—emerged based on the match of their task accuracy to
their self-reported confidence in their accuracy.

General patterns indicated that participants tended to overestimate their
performance. Findings indicated that task accuracy was associated with stronger
activation in the left middle frontal gyrus when evaluating correct models. Additionally,
students in the Calibrated group showed higher levels of activity in the anterior cingulate
gyrus on trials they were confident on in the model evaluation task than students in the
Non-Calibrated group. These results suggest that students in the Calibrated group are
better at recognizing the need for effortful and strategic reasoning during trials that
demand error detection and that they, therefore, deploy PFC during these trials. These
findings also highlight metacognition, and specifically students' self-monitoring, as a core
target for STEM educators to promote effective reasoning, as well as a need to nurture
and foster metacognition and self-awareness in the classroom.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Self-regulation, the amount of control students have over their own cognition,
motivation, behavior, and emotions, lies at the heart of learning. Self-regulation involves
the extent to which students are functionally engaged in their learning acquisition while
also being self-motivated and behaviorally active (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1988).
Successful and efficient learners demonstrate high levels of self-regulation in order to
accomplish a task or a goal by correcting and monitoring the effectiveness of strategies,
as well as by evaluating and self-reflecting on past behaviors to gain more control over
future events (Roebers, 2017). Additionally, self-regulation includes multiple
metacognitive skills. Metacognition refers to one’s knowledge of cognition (declarative)
and self-awareness of the need to understand and control one’s learning and thinking
processes. When learners develop high self-regulation and metacognitive skills, they can
consciously revise and reconstruct concepts to advance their knowledge (e.g., conceptual
change), which is key to learning.
Defining Metacognition
In cognitive research, the discovery and study of metacognition has been widely
recognized. The initial, yet provisional, definition of metacognition is “thinking about
thinking” (Flavell, 1979). However, a more precise definition seeks to understand
metacognition as the critical awareness of or ability to monitor, regulate, control, and
sequence one’s thoughts and performance (Cross & Paris, 1988). Contemporary
conceptualizations generally divide metacognition into two distinct classifications:
knowledge about cognition (including self-monitoring) and self-regulatory mechanisms
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(Cross & Paris, 1988; Flavell, 1979; (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Self-monitoring is
concerned with knowing how well one is performing and with recognizing whether one is
likely to be accurate or erroneous in judgment or behavior. On the other hand,
metacognitive regulation is the process of organizing one’s cognition, including planning,
being aware of one’s comprehension, task performance, and evaluating the efficacy of
strategies. Self-monitoring and metacognitive regulation are both important for this study
because they are skills that help students learn how to self-assess their behavior and to
evaluate the effectiveness of their learning strategies.
In the wake of Cross and Paris (1988), Schunk and Zimmerman (1994) were the
first researchers to integrate self-regulation and metacognition into academic settings. In
his self-regulated learning model, Zimmerman (2013) focused on the learner’s beliefs
about their ability to engage in actions, thoughts, emotions, and behaviors in order to
achieve a goal, as well as on how they self-monitor and self-reflect on their progress.
Research indicates that both self-regulation and metacognition are essential to learning
because students who self-regulate tend to have both high self-efficacy in performing a
specific task and high levels of self-discipline (Bandura, 2001). These qualities mean that
self-regulated learners are also more likely to persist in the face of difficult learning tasks
(Paris & Newman, 1990; Winne, 2010). Self-regulation is a technique that allows
students to view learning within a proactive, constructivist approach, rather than
considering the learning process as a passive act where learning occurs as the result of
instruction imposed from the outside (Zimmerman, 2002).
As Zimmerman (2002) noted, several executive control functions are necessary
for students to complete complex academic tasks. First, learners need to be able to
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understand their general level of knowledge, as well as their thought processes
(metacognitive knowledge) and to regulate their knowledge. For example, students with
effective metacognitive knowledge skills can distinguish concepts they have already
mastered from those they need to continue to study. Second is monitoring, which
includes assessing comprehension while progressing through a task, as well as evaluating
and revising the effectiveness of current strategies. The third and last executive functions
are failure detection and failure correction. While failure detection refers to correctly
identifying and detecting errors, failure correction indicates going back and fixing any
known errors. In general, if learners lack the skills to produce correct answers, they
cannot determine whether their answers are right or wrong, which exposes undeveloped
skills in the areas of metacognitive judgment, self-awareness, and self-calibration.
In educational psychology, calibration is defined by how accurately individuals
assess their confidence in their own knowledge (Stone, 2000). Effective self-monitoring
relies on accurate or well-calibrated performance assessments (Pieschl, 2009). Research
studies that examine calibration often ask participants to predict the correctness of their
responses to test items (Wollenschläger et al, 2016). Calibration accuracy typically is
defined as the degree of comparison between learners’ true and the learners’ selfpredicted task performance (Andrade, 2019), where learners’ levels of confidence should
correlate positively with their performance.
Students who lack regulatory skills tend to make inaccurate judgments of their
own performance. In the absence of accurate external or self-delivered feedback, learners
are unlikely to recognize the need to implement effortful strategies that improve
performance (Zimmerman, 2013). Conversely, calibrated performance judgments are
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likely to support both reflection and recognition of the need to deploy cognitive
resources. In addition to self-calibration and self-awareness, reported self-confidence in
one’s performance is an important concept in understanding metacognition. Measures of
confidence allow researchers to compare the level of students’ confidence to their
accuracy in performances. Confidence estimates tend to be higher when correct and
lower when incorrect (Fleming et al., 2010). However, more specifically, lowerperforming students tend to be more overconfident in their performance predictions, and
higher-performing learners tend to be more accurate or underconfident (Dunning et al.,
2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Hacker, 2000). Assessments of students’ confidence in
their performance offer one means of assessing their self-awareness and calibration of
their own performance. Research aims to reveal how self-regulation and calibration can,
ultimately, help students become more accurate in and self-aware of their self-monitoring
skills and regulating their knowledge acquisition.
Limited research exists on the neural correlates of self-regulation and
metacognition. Zimmerman’s Self-Regulated Learning theory infers that students with
efficient task strategies possess higher levels of self-monitoring skills. That is, students
with high metacognitive calibration will also have high self-regulation and self-awareness
skills, suggesting that they might be inclined to engage in error checking and in error
detection. Additionally, these students might also have higher activation in the prefrontal
cortex (PFC), given the important role this brain region plays in self-awareness and
executive function (Friedman & Robbins, 2022).
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Purpose of the Present Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between undergraduate
life sciences students’ metacognitive calibration and their behavioral performance and
brain activity when engaged in reasoning about the accuracy of biological models.
Model-based reasoning is a core area of STEM education and offers a relevant context
for understanding how metacognitive calibration contributes to STEM learning. There is
currently only limited research that examines the relationship between metacognition and
academic performance among undergraduates as a whole. Although common themes
frequently appear in the self-regulation and metacognitive literature, there is an even
greater paucity of literature that focuses more specifically on undergraduate biology
students' neural activity regarding metacognition. Given the opportunity to conduct such
research, several intriguing questions arise. The main research questions guiding this
thesis are as follows:
1. Because recent research has indicated that students tend to overestimate their
metacognitive and self-regulatory skills, can we identify whether life sciences
undergraduate students attending a Midwestern university can be classified as
Calibrated or Non-Calibrated based on performance assessments?
2. In light of question one above, if students can be grouped based on calibration, do
the members of the two groups differ in neural activity?
3. How does students’ calibration relate to academic achievements, such as Grade
Point Average (GPA) and to their general cognitive performance?
Our laboratory study hypothesized that undergraduates can be categorized as either
Calibrated or Non-Calibrated based on their confidence and task performance.
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Furthermore, we predicted that Calibrated students would exhibit higher activity in
anterior brain regions, including the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), especially when evaluating models that contained misconceptions or
errors. The rationale for these hypotheses is based on the literature reviewed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Metacognition and its Relation to Self-Regulation
Over the past several decades, the topic of metacognition has gained attention
within the field of educational psychology. In the late 1970s, Flavell broadly coined and
defined the term metacognition as “thinking about thinking.” Flavell (1979) focused on
the interaction among metacognitive knowledge, experiences, goals, and strategies. He
suggested that the developmental process of metacognitive skills is contingent on how
learners create, evaluate, and revise tasks, goals, and strategies. Zimmerman (1986)
further defined metacognition as the ability to adjust behavioral, environmental
functioning in response to changing academic demands. In addition, Pintrich (1994)
defined academic metacognition as a construct comprised of three major elements. The
first is active control over learning-related behaviors. The second involves how students
learn to control their emotions (e.g., self-regulation of motivation and affect). The third is
the amount of control the individual has over various cognitive strategies for learning
(e.g., rehearsal and memory strategies).
Over time, educational psychologists have further developed the definition of
metacognition to incorporate the cognitive awareness, management, and control of one’s
thoughts (Cross & Paris, 1998; Kuhn & Dean, 2004). Schraw and colleagues (2006) also
suggested that metacognition should be classified under self-regulated learning because
self-regulated learning involves concepts of self-awareness, motivation, and higher
cognitive processes. While the definition continues to be updated, researchers tend to
agree that metacognition consists of the following two components (Cross & Paris, 1988;
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Flavell, 1979): knowledge about cognition (metacognitive knowledge) and regulation of
cognition (metacognitive regulation). Metacognitive knowledge is the knowledge,
awareness, and deeper understanding of one’s cognitive processes, which is expanded
through self-evaluation.
One main component of metacognition regulation is the individual’s monitoring
of cognition through planning, regulating, and evaluating (Cross & Paris, 1988).
Metacognitive research primarily focuses on individuals’ subjective, introspective
responses following their performances. Metacognitive monitoring and judgments are
typically studied by comparing the accuracy of individuals’ responses on tasks to their
level of confidence about their performances. For example, Stanton et al. (2015) explored
biology undergraduates’ metacognitive monitoring and judgments by examining both
their exam performances and their study habits. While most students were willing to
reflect on and adjust their study plans, researchers found that many actually do not
identify appropriate learning strategies or carry out their new plans. In other words,
students may need additional help to improve their metacognitive knowledge, which can,
in turn, enhance their study habits and strategies.
Following, Mathabathe (2019) explored students’ reasonings and justifications for
their perceived academic performances on pre-and post-test chemistry tests to understand
the relationship between confidence levels and academic performance. The research
found that the learning experience in chemistry was most productive for students who
both acknowledged and articulated that they did not know what they did not know and
whose reported confidence matched their lack of knowledge. Additionally, students who
were more realistic (calibrated) in their performance evaluation tended to be more certain
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in their confidence judgment ratings in the posttest (e.g., “don’t feel confident,” “it’s
right”) than students who were overconfident in their judgments of performance.
Effective calibration is critical to overall learning, as students who are more aware of
their performance can use self-regulatory skills to create, monitor, and revise strategies
for subsequent performances (Magno, 2010; Siegesmund, 2017).
Researchers debate whether metacognitive judgments stem from mental activity,
such as reflective evaluations of one’s knowledge, or whether metacognitive judgments
relate to inferences based on heuristics or personal experiences (Lyon & Zelazo, 2011).
In viewing metacognition from a developmental framework, research suggests that
metacognitive judgments can be recognized and probed based on heuristic cues
(Schwartz, 2002; Koriat & Ackerman, 2010), which also explains why metacognitive
judgments can be described as “intuitive feelings” (Price & Norman, 2008) concerning
performance. However, Dinsmore, Alexander, and Loughlin (2008) noted that
metacognitive judgment also should emphasize both learner development and how the
learner interacts with the environment to maximize and optimize the ability to learn. In
general, metacognitive self-monitoring and judgments are based on a variety of internal
and external cues (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017), including those that derive from the
complexity of the task and from one’s experiences of attempting the task (e.g., reflective
evaluations). While the basis for metacognitive judgment in intuition or self-reflection
remains unclear, the literature is consistent in suggesting that calibration accuracy
represents an important process supporting self-regulated learning.
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Metacognition: Links to Academic Performance and Confidence
The accuracy of metacognitive judgments tends to increase throughout childhood
and into young adulthood (Schneider & Lockl, 2008; Weil et al., 2013). Additionally,
students’ metacognitive skills progressively become more concordant with their actual
performance with age (Schneider, 1998). This association is most likely attributable to
students’ increase in content knowledge and language skills over time, which can help
explain why they develop an increasingly more accurate foundation for assessing the
quality of their performance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Zelazo and Cunningham (2007)
also noted that the accuracy of metacognitive judgments can improve with age because of
students’ increasing ability to “psychologically distance themselves from their ongoing
mental activity” which helps them gain a “broader perspective of their cognitive activity
and its likely outcomes.” (Lyons & Zelazo, 2011, p. 379).
One method for studying metacognitive judgments or students’ calibration is to
measure and compare their confidence and their academic performance. Generally,
higher-performing students demonstrate high accuracy when predicting their test
performance scores; lower-performing students show strong overconfidence in their
predictions (Hacker et al., 2000). While metacognitive judgments improve with age, the
degree to which students can accurately self-assess and self-evaluate their performances
involves their self-awareness of their knowledge deficits. More recently, Morphew
(2021) examined the role of students’ metacognitive monitoring in a physics course by
comparing their predicted test performance and actual performance. The findings
indicated that low-performing students were less accurate at predicting their exam
performances and were less likely to improve their metacognitive calibration than were
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high-performing students, supporting the indicators described in previous literature. The
roles of metacognitive monitoring and confidence in academic achievement can be
viewed as a form of thought validation. Metacognitive confidence is a student’s level of
belief in his or her ability to achieve a standard of accuracy (Fleming & Lau, 2014). In
general, positive beliefs and thoughts on exam performances increase confidence, while
negative views reduce confidence and performance (Moreno, Briñol, & Petty, 2021).
While calibration feedback can help students improve their monitoring skills
(Miller and Geraci, 2011), low-performing students who received feedback about the
accuracy of their predictions, surprisingly, seemed to respond by becoming increasingly
overconfident in their work, even though their test performance scores did not improve
(Miller & Geraci, 2011; Callender et al., 2015; Morphew, 2021). Clayson (2005) noted
that students’ demonstrable level of competency could explain the discrepancy between
confidence and actual performance. In other words, students who do not know what they
do not know (lack of metacognitive knowledge) lack the cognitive ability to recognize or
be aware of the changes necessary in order to develop more effective skills or strategies.
Another hypothesis suggests that those students actually are aware of their knowledge
deficits, but that they nevertheless choose to be consistently overconfident in their
abilities, seemingly demonstrating resistance to recognizing that they have a knowledge
acquisition problem. Collectively, the literature suggests a strong degree of overlap
between students’ levels of metacognitive calibration and their performance.
Metacognition and Intelligence
Another plausible mechanism by which metacognition might relate to
achievement is via their mutual relation to students’ intelligence. However, there is only
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limited research that investigates precisely how metacognition is linked to general
intelligence. College students with learning disabilities exhibit significant difficulties in
various academic domains, including reading, writing, math, and science, which increase
their risk for dropping out of college as compared to students who do not have learning
disabilities (Trainin & Swanson, 2005; Zeleke, 2004). However, with proper academic
support and with training in skills for self-regulation, students with learning disabilities
can achieve normative levels of success. For example, Trainin and Swanson (2005) found
that GPA and academic achievement increased when metacognitive learning strategies
and help-seeking activities were available for students with reading and learning
disabilities. In other words, metacognitive strategies can help all college students,
regardless of ability, to regulate and monitor their learning process by managing time, by
understanding how to study efficiently, and by creating a healthy and nurturing learning
environment (Pintrich, 1994). These findings suggest a limited overlap between
metacognition and intelligence.
In addition, some studies suggest that it is students’ beliefs about intelligence, as
opposed to their measured performance on cognitive assessments, that are most closely
linked to metacognition. Students who consistently, effectively, and accurately regulate
and monitor their learning tend to be more successful learners because they are better at
interpreting metacognitive cues (Miele & Molden, 2010; Finley, Tullis, & Benjamin,
2010). Learners who accurately report what they have learned are monitoring their
learning and have better control over their metacognitive knowledge than those who
inaccurately report what they have learned (Thiede, Anderson, & Therriault, 2003). Peng
and Tullis (2019) studied both how beliefs about the nature of intelligence affect learners’
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metacognitive control and how those beliefs impact students’ study choices. The
researchers found that students’ implicit assumptions of intelligence affect their level of
engagement, which, in turn, affects their goals and metacognitive control. For example,
learners who view intelligence as malleable and flexible showed greater mental
engagement and stronger memory during cognitive tasks (Peng & Tullis, 2019). Overall,
there is very limited literature examining the overlap between intelligence and
metacognition but the small amount of research that does exist indicates that the overlap
is minimal and that any intersections between metacognition and intelligence may be
explained by student belief systems.
Metacognition and the Brain
Few studies address how metacognitive skills are reflected in specific brain
activation. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for metacognition (Shimamura &
Squire, 1986) and self-awareness (Mansouri et al., 2017), and metacognitive judgments
are linked to activation in the medial PFC (Fleming, 2021). Though neuroimaging
literature, in general, has studied metacognition on arbitrary tasks or in terms of thinking
about the self rather than studying metacognitive calibration in relation to authentic
learning tasks. Fleming and colleagues (2010) MRI to examine individuals’ introspective
and metacognitive ability with respect to task performances. The researchers suggested
that the anterior and dorsolateral PFC play a central role in metacognitive sensitivity, the
ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect stimuli. Additionally, in a largescale functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study, Molenberghs and colleagues
(2016) investigated individuals’ differences in metacognitive ability and subjective
feelings of confidence while performing high level social and cognitive tasks. Their study
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found that higher metacognitive accuracy was associated with decreased activation in the
anterior medial PFC, which is linked to perception and autographical memory.
Additionally, researchers found that an increase in reported confidence was linked to
lower metacognitive accuracy on the social and cognitive tasks, indicating that
individuals tend to overestimate their performance, which can undermine the accuracy of
their metacognitive judgment. This limited literature on the neural mechanisms involved
in metacognition, therefore, suggests that the dorsolateral and anterior medial PFC may
be centrally involved in metacognitive calibration such that greater activity in these areas
is associated with higher levels of self-awareness and metacognitive accuracy.
Conceptual Change in Science Learning and its Relation to Metacognitive Calibration
One mechanism via which metacognitive calibration may be linked to scientific
learning is by affording greater potential for conceptual change. Students learning
scientific concepts must be able to actively develop their learning process; they need to
learn how to connect new concepts and relationships with prior knowledge, as well as
how to integrate those new pieces of knowledge with existing knowledge (Dong et al.,
2020). For conceptual change to occur, learners must first become dissatisfied with their
existing conceptions and then find the new conception to be plausible (Posner et al.,
1982). Conceptual change is important because learners must consciously revise and
reconstruct concepts in order to advance their knowledge. However, concepts tend to be
difficult to change or correct when learners hold misconceptions (Dole & Sinatra, 1998;
Nadelson et al., 2018). In the “hard” sciences such as physics, misconceptions fall away
quickly in the face of measurable, concrete facts, which resist being altered by subjective
opinion.
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As we move toward biology and away from the seemingly fixed nature of matter,
we open the door to more fluid speculation and interpretation about why events happen in
the biological world in the way that they do. Now, there is room for misconceptions to
emerge in the way that students think about the biological world. Many of these
misconceptions can emerge at an early age, can be based upon unscientific sources of
knowledge, or be exacerbated by formal education and linger for months and years
(Coley & Tanner, 2015). Unfortunately, ineffective pedagogical strategies experienced
throughout one’s early education can entrench misconceptions in the classroom setting.
For example, young children often think that plants are not living things in the sense that
they do not have complex ecological systems required for survival (Venville, 2004).
Other common biology misconceptions among students include the notion that plants get
their food from the soil or that genes and alleles are the same concept (Tekkayam, 2002).
Lack of, or poor, metacognition can predict the extent to which learners ignore new
information and can predict the degree to which they are unwilling to change their minds,
even when they receive information that indicates they were wrong about their original
belief (Fleming, 2021). Though, for learners who hold misconceptions, conceptual
change is more likely to occur when a scientific viewpoint is offered which causes some
cognitive conflict (e.g., error detection) (Broughton et al., 2010). Conceptual change
occurs when students can allow inaccurate prior knowledge to be replaced by accurate or
updated concepts.
The students’ ability to embrace conceptual change is especially relevant for
science learning. The relationship between metacognitive skills and conceptual change
must exist because individuals routinely recognize existing conceptions, evaluate them,
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and decide whether to reconstruct their understanding of a concept or topic, a process that
requires metacognitive ability (Gunstone & Mitchell, 2005). Students need to be able to
recognize that they are making errors before they can revise their concepts.
Metacognitive calibration may be the first critical step in the process of reconstruction.
Students who are more metacognitively aware of misconceptions about a given topic are
more likely to develop a deeper understanding of a concept or topic (e.g., having correct
knowledge), decreasing the likelihood of developing misconceptions (Pieschl et al.,
2021). On the other hand, students who are unaware of their misconceptions might be
overconfident about or overly satisfied with their misconceptions (i.e., they do not know
what they do not know) (Ehrliner et al., 2008; Pieschl et al., 2021). This idea suggests
that metacognitive calibration can be a pivotal mechanism for enlightenment while
correcting misconceptions.
Conceptual change, as it relates to science and learning science, requires students
to have deep cognitive engagement in order to reach a point of dissatisfaction with prior
conclusions which leads to the desire to accurately revise and reconstruct their knowledge
(Nadelson et al., 2018). Student must be able to reach a stage of dissatisfaction which
allows them to transition into learning new concepts in domains where they already
possess functioning concepts (Smortchkova & Shea, 2020). However, there is little
investigation into the role of metacognition in conceptual change, most likely because of
the fundamental difficulties in designing an experimental route that would ensure
scientifically sound results. We do know, however, that learners engage in self-reflective
and self-evaluative thinking in order to match new pieces of information that examines,
evaluates, and, ultimately, recognizes newer concepts which, then, replaces incomplete or
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inaccurate information within the students’ body of understanding (Schunk & Ertmer,
2000; Posner et al., 1982).
Brain Activity During Error Detection
While there are no apparent studies that have examined neural activity in relation
to science learning and metacognition simultaneously, limited literature on neural regions
involved in science cognition highlights its dependence on prefrontal regions. Masson
and colleagues (2014) used fMRI to compare novices and experts in science when asked
to evaluate the accuracy of how simple electrical circuits work. The researchers found
that error detection and conflict monitoring mechanisms play a role in observed
differences in brain activity between novices and experts. This finding also indicated that
experts, when evaluating scientific circuits, activated more brain regions, particularly
those associated with inhibition (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), ventrolateral PFC
(VLPFC), and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) than novices, who tended to activate the
DLPFC solely.
Similarly, Brault Foisy et al. (2015) found that the ACC and PFC play distinct
roles in cognitive control during scientific reasoning. Individuals activate the ACC when
they provide both correct and incorrect responses to scientific conceptions, whereas only
the dorsolateral PFC is activated when individuals give correct answers. Potvin and
colleagues (2020) recruited chemistry professors to test their cognitive knowledge by
examining their inhibitory control response and common misconceptions using fMRI.
The researchers found that both the left DLPFC and left VLPFC exhibited greater
activation when participants were presented with scientific statements containing
misconceptions, supporting previous research linking DLPFC to the resolution of
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misconceptions. In their review paper, Vaughn, Brown, and Johnson (2020) focused on
the educational neuroscience framework of conceptual change by examining brain
activation and cognitive processes linked to conceptual change in science-related tasks.
When individuals view tasks that involve mental reconstruction of scientific models,
researchers noted significant activation in the ACC, VLPFC, and DLPFC.
General Summary & Limitations of the Literature
Vast potential exists in educational neuroscience research to examine both the
cognitive and affective changes in learners. In general, recent neuroimaging literature has
determined, in fact, that a relatively small and well-defined area of the brain, which
includes the ACC, DLPFC, and VLPFC, is consistently involved when processing
scientific conceptions and misconceptions. However, more studies are needed to
understand the relationship between learners’ metacognition calibration and performance,
as well as to understand how metacognition calibration and performance are reflected in
the brain. More specifically, more research needs to examine the role of metacognitive
calibration in conceptual change in science. While most science neuroimaging studies
have been done with physics students, limited research on students in biology and life
sciences exists, largely because of the difficulties in designing tasks that capture the
complexity of biological systems and that still allow for scientific rigor. There are reasons
to believe that resolving misconceptions in life sciences is as important as in physics, as
recognizing these errors in biological thinking (e.g., erroneous ideas about the nature of
evolution or about the links between DNA and protein formation) is central to deep
conceptual understanding.
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Research has revealed that lower-performing students tend to report being
overconfident or overestimating their performances more than higher-performing
students (Hacker et al., 2000; Miller & Geraci, 2011). However, the reason for this
association remains unclear. One explanation is the “double curse,” in which lowperforming students are both incapable of assessing their performance and unaware of
their low metacognitive skills (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning & Kruger, 2008).
Another interpretation holds that low-performing students are aware of their performance
level but nevertheless continue to overestimate their abilities. More recently, counter to
the double curse, Miller and Geraci (2011) found that low-performing students are, in
fact, somewhat aware of their low metacognitive judgment and calibration skills. Also,
while there is a lack of studies investigating the direct relationship between
metacognition and intelligence and those examining how metacognition can predict
academic achievement. Again, further research is needed to address these questions.
While research reveals more about the relation of students’ calibration levels to
academic performance, a surprisingly limited amount of research examines which areas
of the brain are involved in metacognitive skills or how these regions are deployed during
complex academic tasks. Indeed, most neuroimaging research on metacognition has not
been conducted in the context of authentic learning tasks, despite the central relevance of
metacognition to learning-related conceptual change. Likewise, only a limited body of
research focuses on the neuroscientific framework of error detection which could link
metacognition calibration skills to academic performance. There is a large and growing
body of research on conceptual change and science learning within educational
psychology; however, integration with neuroscientific research is far less common. This
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thesis will consider whether lateral PFC activity is related to higher levels of calibration
in order to understand more about the ways in which metacognition facilitates science
learning.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Participants
Thirty-five undergraduate students participated in the study for monetary
compensation. They were recruited through class announcements from an introductory
life sciences course at a large Midwestern university. Students were screened to ensure
that they did not have a learning disability, attention-deficit or hyperactivity disorder,
experience of concussion, or other neurological diagnosis that might impact neural
response patterns and that they had no contraindications to MRI. One student was
excluded from analyses because they consistently gave the same response to every task
trial. Of the final analytic sample (Valid N = 34, Mage= 19.47, SDage = .45), 26 (76.47%)
were first-year freshmen, six (17.65%) were sophomores, and two (5.88%) were juniors.
Three (8.82%) were first-generation college students. Thirty (88.24%) were European
American/White, one (2.94%) was Hispanic, two (5.88%) were Asian, and one (2.94%)
identified as both European American/White and Hispanic. All but two students were
native English speakers, and 29 (85%) were female, the remainder identifying as male.
The average grade-point average (GPA), on a 4.0 scale and collected through a third
party from the Registrar’s Office, was 3.61 (SD = .49).
Materials
All procedures were approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board, and
participants provided written, informed consent to participation. Scans were also sent to a
radiologist for review and students were informed of any incidental findings, with all of
these being limited to sinus congestion. Students were compensated with $50 cash after
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attending a 2-hour appointment at the university’s imaging center, where they completed
an fMRI task.
Students underwent MRI in a 3 Tesla Siemens Skyra scanner using a 32-channel
head coil. First, a T1-weighted MPRAGE was acquired (TR = 1, TE =2.95ms, voxel size
= 1mm3, flip angle = 9, field of view = 270, 176 sagittal slices) for registration purposes.
This scan was followed by T2*-weighted echoplanar images (TR = 1s, TE = 25ms, 3 mm
voxels, flip angle =90, FOV = 224mm) collected during the model evaluation task.
Procedures
Model Evaluation Task
In the scanner, participants evaluated a series of models, formatted as flow charts,
diagrams, or textbook-like images, that captured a breadth of content from the
Introduction to Life Sciences course (e.g., human evolution, the central dogma, genetic
mutation). Stimuli were designed to examine the participants’ ability to detect errors and
inhibit misconceptions (see Figure 1). To provide context for the model, students first
saw a two-second prompt. They then viewed a model and prompt for ten seconds, after
which they could take up to 30 seconds to indicate via a response pad whether the model
was correct or incorrect. Lastly, participants were cued to indicate whether they were
confident in their response (yes or no). Participants completed three separate, randomlyordered runs (approximately five minutes each). Each run was composed of twelve
randomly-ordered trials. Most models had two incorrect versions for every correct one,
with 14 total correct trials and 22 error-containing trials. Trials were followed by a
baseline rest period lasting two to ten seconds, during which students saw random images
extracted from the model stimuli.
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Following the above task that required the use of the MRI scanner, participants
were then asked to circle on a printed sheet where they believed the error in the model
was based on their responses in the scanner. They also provided a short rationale for the
errors they indicated. Participants were not made aware whether their answers to the
model evaluation task were correct or incorrect.
Cognitive Assessments and Surveys
Participants also completed the Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test-2 (KBIT-2)
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) to assess their verbal and non-verbal reasoning, which is an
approximate measure of intelligence and general cognitive ability. After the cognitive
assessment, participants completed a short Qualtrics survey to collect basic
demographics. In that survey, participants completed Baldwin, Ebert-May, and Burns’s
(1999) College Biology Self-Efficacy assessment to determine their self-reported
confidence in using biology in classrooms and daily lives, with 1 being “totally
confident” and 5 being “not at all confident.” Baldwin, Ebert-May, and Burns (1999)
found three substantial factors that emerged from their factor analysis of the Biology Self
Efficacy measure. Factor 1 represented students’ reported confidence in writing and
critiquing biological ideas through laboratory reports, as well as using analytical skills to
conduct biological experiments (eight questions). Factor 2 focused on students’ reported
confidence in generalizing skills learned through current and future biology and science
courses, as well as using scientific approaches to solve problems (nine questions). Last,
Factor 3 related to students’ reported confidence in applying biological concepts and
skills to everyday events (six questions) (p. 402).
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Last, participants filled out a modified version of the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale questionnaire. This scale was comprised of 12 items, with eight items measuring
positive affect and four items measuring negative affect (see Appendix A). Participants
were asked to indicate, on a scale of one to five, their levels of each of the 12 emotions
while completing the fMRI activities, with one indicating low levels of that emotion and
five indicating high levels. From the survey, responses to the emotions interested,
motivated, attentive, and determined were used to compute a new variable called
Engagement.
Data Analysis
For each trial, we used SPSS (IBM Corp., Released 2020) to calculate whether
students’ confidence matched their accuracy. A response was designated ‘over-confident’
if students were confident but incorrect, ‘under-confident’ if they were not confident of
an accurate response, or calibrated if accuracy and confidence corresponded. Participants
were then classified as Calibrated (N = 19) if the absolute discrepancy between their total
accuracy and total confidence was < 4; and Non-Calibrated (N = 15) if the discrepancy
was > 4. (see Table 1 for Demographics of these two groups). Here, the cutoff was
determined for these groups to be four because that was the absolute average discrepancy
between total accuracy and confidence. We also examined the effects of over-estimating
performance: students with > 8 ‘over-confident’ responses were considered
Overconfident (N = 19), as opposed to Calibrated/Underconfident (N = 15). Eight was the
cutoff number to define students in Overconfident groups because that was the average
number of overconfident responses. Additionally, participants were grouped into three
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tritiles based on cumulative GPAs, with tritile 3 being the top tier (3.89 to 4.0) and the
bottom tier ranging from 2.05 to 3.4.
Functional MRI data were processed and analyzed using the FMRIB Software
Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). Images were
corrected for head motion, registered to the T1 image and normalized to the MNI 2mm
template. In first level models for each run, we regressed the fMRI signal on task onsets
convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response function. Separate contrasts
were performed for error models > baseline; correct models > baseline, and errorcontaining > correct models. Furthermore, we contrasted trials where students responded
they were confident > non-confident trials. Parameters were averaged in fixed effects
models and passed to a group analysis conducted with a mixed effects ANOVA.
Students’ total fMRI task accuracy was covaried in all group comparisons so that any
comparison of Calibrated and non-Calibrated groups in their brain activity already
accounts for potential group differences in accuracy. Group contrasts were thresholded at
a cluster-corrected Z of 3.1 at p <.05.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
We examined all data distributions to evaluate whether they met statistical
assumptions. All data were normally distributed with minimal skew (skewness is from
.12 to .57) and kurtosis (kurtosis is from -.75 to -.04). Results for each research question
are presented below.
Can life sciences undergraduate students be classified as Calibrated or Non-Calibrated
based on performance assessments? (RQ 1)
Behavioral Results from Model Evaluation Task
In general, there was a moderate correlation between total accurate responses and
total confident responses (r = .41, p = .02) (see Figure 2). Figure 3 illustrates students’
total accuracy on the model-based fMRI task relative to their total number of reported
confident responses based on their calibration groups. For students in the Calibrated
group, there was a strong linear association between accuracy and confidence (r =.91, p
<.001), but there was a much less robust relationship for students in the Non-Calibrated
group (r =.22, p =.44).
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare both groups’ total
accuracy and total confident responses, as well as their general academic achievement.
The mean accuracy for the students in the Calibrated and Non-Calibrated groups was
similar, M (SD) = 23.84 (4.46) vs. 23.00 (3.23), t(32) = -.61, p = .54. Additionally,
students in the Non-Calibrated group showed higher confidence than students in the
Calibrated group, M (SD) = 30.33 (3.77) vs. 24.00 (3.67), t(32)= 4.94, p < .001. GPA
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correlated positively with total task accuracy (r = .43, p = .01), but not with confidence, r
= -.07, p = .69.
Additionally, Figure 4 illustrates that when participants were inaccurate, they
tended to be overconfident, as opposed to underconfident, in their responses. Therefore,
we conducted additional exploratory analyses that focused on the differences between
students who were Overconfident compared to students who were
Calibrated/Underconfident. Students in the Overconfident group were less accurate on
the model evaluation task than students in the Calibrated/Underconfident groups, N = 19,
M (SD) = 21.37 (2.34) vs. N = 15, M (SD) = 26.13 (3.98), t(32) = 4.36, p < .001. They
also had lower GPAs, M (SD) = 3.41 (.53) vs. M (SD) = 3.89 (.24), t(32) = 3.22, p = .003.
Do Students in the Calibrated and Non-Calibrated group differ in neural activity? (RQ
2)
Neuroimaging Results from Model Evaluation Task
We conducted separate comparisons of brain activity for correct models and
error-containing models relative to baseline (correct models > baseline; error models >
baseline). Controlling for students’ overall task accuracy, there were no differences in
brain activity for students in the Calibrated vs. Non-Calibrated group or students who in
the Overconfident vs. Calibrated/Underconfident group. However, task accuracy was
associated with stronger activation in the left middle frontal gyrus (158 voxels; BA 10)
when evaluating correct models (see Figure 5). Next, we contrasted brain activity for
error > correct models. Overall (across the entire sample), students did not show a
significant difference in their responses to these different trial types.
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We also compared students’ brain activity in relation to their confidence
judgments. Specifically, we examined the difference in brain activity for confident > nonconfident trials. Two students were excluded from this analysis because they reported
that they were confident on every trial. In general, students in the Calibrated group
showed higher levels of activity in five different brain region clusters for their confident
responses. The largest of these clusters was in the anterior cingulate gyrus (254 voxels,
BA 32) (see Figure 6).
How does students’ calibration relate to academic achievements, such as GPA and to
their general cognitive performance? (RQ 3)
To address research question 3, we compared the calibration groups on other
measures of behavior, including GPA, general cognitive performance, self-efficacy, and
engagement in the modeling task (See Table 2).
Academic Achievement (GPA)
Students in the Calibrated group had a slightly, although not significantly, higher
cumulative GPA (M = 3.71, SD = .48) than students in the Non-Calibrated group (M =
3.51, SD = .49, t(32)= -1.15, p = .26). As an additional exploratory analysis, we examined
the relationship between students’ cumulative GPA and their performance in the model
evaluation task. Participants were categorized into three tritiles based on cumulative
GPAs, with tritile 3 ranging from 3.89 to 4.0 and the lowest tier ranging from 2.05 to 3.4.
In general, for participants in the high tritile (N = 12, M = 27.17, SD = 3.33) total
accuracy rates were higher than participants in middle (N = 10, M = 21.25, SD = 1.82)
and low tritiles (N =12, M = 21.70, SD = 3.30, F(2, 31) = 15.41, p < .001). Additionally,
participants in the low tritile (N =12, M = 27.80, SD = 6.41) were slightly more confident

29
in their responses than those in the middle (N =10, M = 25.92, SD = 4.87) and high tritiles
(N =12, M = 26.83, SD = 3.41, F(2, 31) = .40, p = .68), although this difference was not
significant (see Figures 7 and 8).
Cognitive Assessment Results
Participants completed the KBIT-2, which measured both their verbal and nonverbal reasoning skills. One participant did not fully complete a section of the KBIT-2
assessment because of time constraints. Therefore, the standardized score represented 33
participants. On average, participants’ combined aggregated standardized score on the
assessment was 102.73 (SD = 12.17). Students in the Calibrated group had slightly
higher, although not significantly higher, standardized scores on the tests (N = 19, M =
103.32, SD = 13.96), than students in the Non-Calibrated group (M = 101.93, SD = 9.68,
t(31) = -.32, p = .75).
Reported Self-Efficacy Results
Participants completed Baldwin, Ebert-May, and Burns’s (1999) that assessed
their confidence in completing or performing biology-related tasks. Note that lower
scores indicate higher levels of self-efficacy. In general, participants reported that they
were “very confident” to “fairly confident” that they could do the specific task (M = 2.20,
SD = .84). Students in the Calibrated group reported slightly less confidence (M = 2.35,
SD = .87) than students in the Non-Calibrated group (M = 2.13, SD = .79), although this
difference was not statistically significant for any individual item or for the mean scores,
t(32) = -.65, p = .52. (Appendix B).
Next, we examined the relation of calibration group to each of the three factor
scores for the biology self-efficacy measure. Students in the Non-Calibrated group (N =
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15, M = 17.13, SD = 4.00, t(32) = -1.62, p = .12) reported that they were more confident
in in writing and critiquing biological ideas through laboratory reports (Factor 1) than
students in the Calibrated group (N = 19, M = 19.63, SD = 4.80), although this difference
was not significant. However, the effect size (d = .56) for this factor indicated a moderate
difference. For Factor 2, students in the Calibrated group (M = 19.32, SD = 4.55) and
students in the Non-Calibrated group (M = 19.13, SD = 5.41), t(32) = -.11, p = .92)
reported similar confidence ratings. Similarly, for Factor 3, students in the Calibrated
group (M = 12.84, SD = 4.40) and students in the Non-Calibrated group (M = 12.80, SD =
3.97, t(32) = -.03, p = .98) reported similar confidence ratings.
Reported Positive Negative Affective Scale Results
Participants completed a Positive and Negative Affective Scale that included 12
items. The Engagement variable was used to determine whether the behavioral and neural
results from both the Calibrated and Non-Calibrated groups varied because of different
levels of participation or engagement in the fMRI task. With t(32) = .94, p = .36, there is
evidence to suggest that, on average, students in the Calibrated and Non-Calibrated group
did not differ in engagement levels during the fMRI task.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Effective student learning involves accurate self-regulatory and metacognitive
skills (Stanton et al., 2015; Zimmerman, 1995). Prior research findings demonstrate that
low-performing students are typically less accurate at predicting their academic
performance and tend to have lower metacognitive calibration than high-performing
students (Hacker et al., 2000; Morphew, 2020). Metacognition is central to science
education, because it is critical to developing and cultivating a deep conceptual
understanding of scientific concepts (Nielsen et al., 2009). Specifically, in biology
education, students with a higher awareness of the learning process and a stronger ability
to monitor, regulate, and control learning tend to have a more meaningful understanding
of targeted biology concepts and better scientific inquiry skills (Eilam & Reiter, 2014;
Martin et al., 2000). It is also likely that these students are also more likely to engage in
conceptual change because they are more likely to recognize when there are gaps in their
understanding. Likewise, poor metacognitive skills, such as being overconfident, can lead
to erroneous decision-making behaviors and false ideas, indicating a lack of either
metacognitive awareness of their deficits or ineffective self-regulation skills (Kruger &
Dunning, 1999). This study examined the relationships among undergraduate life
sciences students’ metacognitive calibration, behavioral performance, and brain activity
when engaged in reasoning about the accuracy of biological models.
Metacognitive Calibration and Academic Performance
The first primary goal of this study was to determine whether undergraduate
biology students can be classified as Calibrated or Non-Calibrated based on performance
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assessments. The study revealed two distinct groups of students with individual
differences. While there was a strong linear association between accuracy and confidence
among students in the Calibrated group, there was a moderate and non-significant
relationship between accuracy and confidence for students in the Non-Calibrated group.
Students in the Calibrated group might be better at recognizing the need for increased
effortful or strategic reasoning during trials that demand error detection, which supports
Zimmerman’s self-regulated learning theory. Additionally, this finding suggested that
accurate self-monitoring is a necessary skill for successful learning. For example,
behavioral findings revealed that students in the Calibrated and underconfident students
had a higher GPA than students in the Non-Calibrated, Overconfident group, and that a
higher GPA that correlated with more accurate performances. These findings illustrated
and supported the fact that students tend to be inaccurate in predicting their performance,
especially when performance is low (Hacker et al., 2000). Judging and monitoring
behavior is important in academic settings because strategic thinking leads to effective
reasoning, problem-solving, and concept learning. Successful and calibrated students tend
to use a variety of self-regulated strategies that help them realize their learning and
performance goals, as well as apply their knowledge in novel situations (Stone, 2000;
Zimmerman, 2002).
Neural Correlates of Metacognition
No significant differences in neural activity were found between students in the
Calibrated and Non-Calibrated groups when they were evaluating models with errors vs.
models without errors. Reasons for this finding could include the fact that the analytic
sample size of students was relatively small and that these students, regardless of their
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calibration levels, were highly motivated and fully engaged in biological reasoning (their
ratings on the engagement scale were universally quite high), a factor that may erase
differences in calibration between the two distinct groups. However, we did find that,
when comparing brain activity for trials where students said they were confident relative
to not confident, students in the Calibrated group showed higher activity in the anterior
cingulate gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and occipital cortex after controlling for their
accuracy. That is, students who are calibrated showed more differentiation in their brain
activity for models they later indicated they were confident in relative to those in which
they were not confident. Students in the Calibrated group likely tended to activate the
ACC during the trials largely because they feel more confident in effortful error-detection
processes. On the other hand, students in the Non-Calibrated group seemed to show less
discrimination. These non-discriminating neural pattern findings support the indicators
for their non-calibrated behavior. There is limited research on how the neural correlates
of how metacognition calibration affects academic performance; however, these findings
of differences in calibrated vs. non-calibrated students’ recruitment of frontal regions
support Fleming and Dolan’s (2012) work showing that the lateral PFC is important for
the accuracy of retrospective judgments of performance.
Although there were no differences in brain activity for students in the Calibrated
vs. Non-Calibrated group for model based trials as a whole, task accuracy, in general,
was associated with stronger activation in the left middle frontal gyrus when evaluating
correct models. Consistent with the self-regulated learning theory, these findings suggest
that, regardless of how calibrated students are, if they are more accurate, they tend to
show more PFC activity. Students with higher accuracy may be better at recognizing the
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need for increased effortful or strategic reasoning during trials that demand error
detection and therefore deploy PFC during these trials, similar to what science experts do
(Masson et al., 2014).
Students’ Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is a vital construct because it explains students’ behaviors toward
learning, as well as predicts academic performance (Schunk, 1989). In general, students
in the Calibrated and Non-Calibrated groups did not differ in response to the self-efficacy
questionnaire. A factor as to why students with different patterns of calibration accuracy
did not seem to differ in their levels of self-efficacy might be because the self-efficacy
questionnaire focused solely on topics related to biology, which was the college major for
most of these students. In other words, the questionnaire focused on biology and not on
the broader area of self-efficacy in general. Another reason might be an ambiguous
relationship between self-efficacy and the separate, but related, concept of self-esteem.
More research might reveal that these two concepts of self-efficacy and self-esteem are
less differentiated in student attitudes than is suggested by past empirical studies.
Our findings contradict previous literature, which suggests that self-efficacy
contributes to academic performance because it influences and modifies human behavior
(Bandura, 1977). Students who have a low sense of self-efficacy tend to harbor negative
thoughts and, therefore, set low goals for themselves. While extensive evidence has
proven the effects of self-efficacy on students’ academic accomplishments (Schunk,
1989; Bandura, 1997; Chemens et al. 2001), we do not fully understand whether selfconfidence is a primary cause of academic success or whether that success is rooted more
in the students’ efforts and skills (Yusuf, 2011). What the findings of the current study
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suggest is that calibration accuracy is not necessarily linked to self-efficacy and that
students whose confidence and accuracy are better matched are not necessarily the ones
with higher self-efficacy. Therefore, a full understanding of how individual differences in
self-regulation drive student success may require an evaluation of both constructs, as they
both may have relatively independent effects.
In this study, the self-efficacy questionnaire focused solely on students’
confidence in completing or performing biology-related tasks and not on overall selfefficacy. Developing a healthy sense of self-efficacy is especially important in addressing
challenging subjects, including life science and biology. As course material becomes
more complex and demanding, students’ efficacy becomes an important construct that
influences the potential for learning (Baldwin, Ebert‐May & Burns, 1999. Future research
on self-efficacy should include a focus on how metacognition calibration affects student
achievement in biology and biology-related courses.
Relation between Metacognition, General Cognition, and Learning
In general, metacognition is a broad factor that helps explain how individuals
monitor, judge, and regulate their behaviors (Gomes, Golino & Menezes, 2014; Winne,
1996). Research suggests that both intelligence and metacognition play a role in
determining or predicting academic performance (Meijer, Veenman & van Hout-Wolters,
2012). Specifically, metacognition and intelligence contribute positively to learning
results (Veenman, Elshout & Meijer, 1997; Veenman & Verheij, 2003; Veenman,
Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). In this study, students’ standardized score on the
cognitive assessment in the Calibrated group was slightly higher than students in the
Non-Calibrated group, though difference was not statistically significant. However, the

36
KBIT-2 assessment is not a comprehensive assessment of intelligence and was intended
mainly to get a general indication of students’ general reasoning. The results,
nonetheless, accord well with other literature showing that metacognition is not
dependent on students’ general cognitive performance.
How researchers operationalize intelligence and, particularly, metacognition
determines the strength of the relationship. For example, Flavell (1979) noted that there
are different levels of metacognition, including how individuals plan, monitor, and
evaluate their performance. Flavell also distinguished between metacognitive knowledge,
metacognitive experiences, goals or tasks, and actions or strategies. Whereas Veenman
(1993) stressed that the most important distinction of metacognition is metacognitive
knowledge and metacognitive skill. Moreover, Zimmerman (1986) viewed students’
learning process in three defined phases— forethought, performance, and selfreflection—which highlights how goals and strategic planning guide academic
performance. On the other hand, intelligence is typically measured by assessing
vocabulary, verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, number series and speed, as well as
embedded figures (Meijer, Veenman & van Hout-Wolters, 2012).
To assess fluid intelligence, ratings of self-confidence, and self-evaluation as
measures of metacognition among undergraduate students, Stankov (2000) used a
computerized version of the standard and the advanced forms of Raven’s Progressive
Matrices where participants were also required to express their confidence that their
answer was correct. Findings from their study demonstrated substantial correlations
between non-verbal intelligence and (a) measures of self-confidence and (b) selfevaluation. His work also suggested that self-confidence might be an aspect of a
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metacognition (e.g., self-monitoring), and that self-confidence should be thought of as
“residing somewhere on the borderline between personality and intelligence” (p. 141). As
self-monitoring and self-evaluation skills help students’ success levels, metacognitive
processes are also reinforced.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This study was not without its limitations. One of the significant limitations was
that one life science task is not necessarily indicative of overall academic performance or
general metacognitive abilities. Additional assessments would be beneficial for
determining and evaluating the neural and behavioral effects of metacognitive processes,
as well as for determining whether metacognitive calibration accuracy is a “trait-like”
characteristic or whether it is more content-specific. Specifically in this study, another
potential limitation was the absence of measurements of the participants’ levels of
attention and motivation during the task. Future studies should further investigate and
measure how attention and motivation levels, as well as other individual factors, impact
metacognition skills and their relation to brain activation during essential learning tasks.
Other limitations here included a disproportionate representation of females and EuroAmerican Whites, as well as a small range in GPAs. Lastly, this study was conducted at a
Midwestern university in the United States, which limits generalizability.
Potential future research is needed to determine whether self-regulated learners
are more calibrated. In other words, to what extent can calibration accuracy predict
academic achievement? Understanding this direction may also have important
implications for instructional design. Likewise, future research would also examine how
students might be encouraged to reflect on their calibration accuracy and whether such
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reflection might aid in the process of conceptual change in science. Lastly, potential
future research is needed to determine how metacognition calibration affects students’
learning and academic performance throughout their educational trajectory.
Conclusion
Metacognitive calibration, a metacognitive monitoring skill, refers to students’
ability to monitor their task performance (Crane et al., 2017). For example, when students
can effectively monitor their performance, they can adjust their effort and strategies for
subsequent performances. The concept of calibration typically refers to the accuracy of
learners’ perceptions of their performances (Pieschl, 2009) or, in other words, how aware
they are of their internal processes (Stone, 2000). Most research on metacognition is
concerned with how individuals monitor their progress during learning. Few
neuroimaging studies focus on the neuroscientific framework of error detection, which
suggests the need for investigating a possible link between students’ metacognition
calibration skills and their academic performance.
This thesis aimed to determine whether undergraduate life sciences students who
demonstrated more calibrated self-assessments of their task performance would also
demonstrate higher activity in the lateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate brain regions.
Behavioral findings in this study supported previous research that indicates that more
calibrated students are better at practicing self-regulation skills, such as self-monitoring
and accurately assess their confidence in their own knowledge. Additionally, students in
the Calibrated group showed higher activity in the anterior cingulate gyrus, superior
frontal gyrus and occipital cortex after controlling for their accuracy when comparing
brain activity for trials when they reported they were confident relative to not confident.
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The results of this thesis have important educational implications. First, these
findings stress the need to foster and nurture metacognition and self-awareness in the
classroom. Students who are more self-aware and calibrated are typically more adaptable
to the demands of learning because they are consistently more accurate in their selfmonitoring (Zimmerman, 1995). Having effective self-regulatory and metacognitive
awareness can help students continually to update and modify their knowledge, allowing
for conceptual change to occur. Additionally, instructors could provide opportunities for
students to reflect on their coursework by focusing on the learning process rather than
exclusively on the content or outcomes themselves, thereby engaging students in
reflexive and adaptive thinking. Instructors may also provide direct and immediate
feedback, a core mechanism of self-regulated learning that positively impacts academic
achievement (Butler & Winne, 1995). In other words, feedback has the power to help
guide students’ learning by providing explanations and rationales as to whether they were
correct, which allows students to know what they know or what they do not know.
Ultimately, students who learn and engage in metacognitive skills tend to be more aware
of their thinking and are, therefore, more likely to be both active and more fully
participant in their learning.
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Table 1
Demographics of the Calibration Groups
Demographics
Calibrated

Non-Calibrated

N

%

N

%

Female

18

59.94

11

32.35

Male

1

2.94

4

11.76

European American/White

17

50.00

14

41.17

Hispanic American/Latino

2

5.88

0

0.00

Asian/Asian American

1

2.94

1

2.94

Freshman

15

44.12

11

32.35

Sophomore

3

8.82

3

8.82

Junior

1

2.94

1

2.94

Gender

Race and Ethnicity

Grade Level

Note. Percentages may not add up to 100 percent because of multi-select questions.
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Table 2
Sample Descriptive Statistics for the Calibration Groups
Calibrated

Non-Calibrated

(n = 19)

(n = 15)

M

SD

M

SD

t

p

Cumulative GPA

3.71

.48

3.51

.49

-1.15 .26

KBIT-2

103.32

13.96

101.93

9.68

-.32

.75

Self-Efficacy

2.35

.87

2.13

.79

-.65

.52

Factor 1

19.63

4.80

17.33

4.00

-1.62 .12

Factor 2

19.32

4.55

19.13

5.41

-.11

.92

Factor 3

12.84

4.40

12.80

3.97

-.03

.98

Engagement

16.00

2.05

16.60

1.55

.94

.36
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Figure 1
Layout of the Model Evaluation Task Presented in the fMRI

Figure 1: The model evaluation task required participants to examine and determine
whether the presented biology models contained errors, as well as to assess their
confidence level for each model.
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Figure 2
Total Accurate Responses to Total Confident Responses

Figure 2: Correlation between students’ total accuracy and reported confidence.
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Figure 3
Calibration Groups

Figure 3: The relationship between total accuracy and their total number of reported
confident responses levels based on students’ calibration groups during the model
evaluation task.
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Figure 4
Accurate Trials to Students’ Confidence Ratings

Figure 4: Accurate trials in relation to students’ confidence ratings for the model
evaluation task.

59
Figure 5
Students’ Neural Activity When Evaluating Correct Models

Figure 5: Accuracy during the model evaluation task was associated with stronger
activation in the left middle frontal gyrus when evaluating correct models.
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Figure 6
Calibrated Group’s Neural Activity While Making Confidence Judgments

Figure 6: Students in the Calibrated group showed higher levels of activity in the anterior
cingulate gyrus on trials they were confident on in the model evaluation task than
students in the Non-Calibrated group.
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Figure 7
Total Number of Accurate Responses by Tritiles

Figure 7: Total accuracy rates for participants with low, middle, and high GPA levels.
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Figure 8
Total Number of Confident Responses by Tritiles

Figure 8: Total confident rates for participants with low, middle, and high GPA levels.
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APPENDIX A
Modified PNAS Engagement Assessment
The scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings or emotions.
Read each item and list the number from the scale below next to each word. Indicate to
what extent you felt this way today while you were completing the modeling/fMRI
activities.
1
Very slightly or
not at all

2

3

4

5

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

__________Interested
__________Motivated
__________Distressed
__________Enthusiastic
__________Proud
___________Irritable
___________Alert
___________Inspired
___________Nervous
___________Ashamed
___________Determined
___________Attentive
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APPENDIX B
Calibrated and Non-Calibrated Students’ Self-Efficacy in Biology
Calibrated

NonCalibrated

Total

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

2.00 (.82)

1.93 (.71)

1.97 (.76)

2.58 (.96)

2.00 (.66)

2.32 (.88)

2.16 (1.01)

1.80 (.68)

2.00 (.89)

2.00 (.75)

2.13 (.74)

2.06 (.74)

2.63 (.83)

2.47 (.64)

2.56 (.75)

2.26 (.93)

2.00 (.66)

2.15 (.82)

2.21 (1.03)

2.07 (.88)

2.15 (.96)

How confident are you that you will be
successful in this biology course?

1.50 (.62)

1.73 (.59)

1.61 (.61)

How confident are you that you could
write up the results to a lab report?

1.89 (.74)

2.00 (.76)

1.94 (.74)

How confident are you that after reading
an article about a biology experiment,
you could write a summary of its main
points?
How confident are you that you could
critique a laboratory report written by
another student?
How confident are you that you could
write an introduction to a lab report?
How confident are you that after reading
an article about a biology experiment,
you could explain its main ideas to
another person?
How confident are you that you could
read the procedures for an experiment
and feel sure about conducting the
experiment on your own?
How confident are you that you could
write the methods section of a lab report
(i.e., describe the experimental
procedures)?
How confident are you that after
watching a television documentary
dealing with some aspect of biology, you
could write a summary of its main
points?
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How confident are you that after
watching a television documentary
dealing with some aspect of biology, you
could explain its main ideas to another
person?
How confident are you that you will be
successful in another biology course?
How confident are you that you could
write the conclusion to a lab report?
How confident are you that after listening
to a public lecture regarding some
biology topic, you could write a
summary of its main points?
How confident are you that you would be
successful in an ecology course?
How confident are you that you could
analyze a set of data (i.e., look at the
relationships between variables)?
How confident are you that after listening
to a public lecture regarding some
biology topic, you could explain its main
ideas to another person?
How confident are you that you would be
successful in a human physiology
course?
How confident are you that you could
tutor another student on how to write a
lab report?
How confident are you that you could
critique an experiment described in a
biology textbook (i.e., list the strengths
and weaknesses)?
How confident are you that you could
tutor another student for this biology
course?

2.00 (.82)

1.93 (.88)

1.97 (.83)

1.68 (.58)

2.00 (.93)

1.82 (.76)

2.26 (.65)

1.80 (.56)

2.06 (.65)

2.42 (1.07)

2.40 (.83)

2.41 (.96)

2.63 (.96)

2.40
(1.06)

2.53 (.99)

2.21 (.98)

2.20 (.68)

2.21 (.85)

2.21 (.92)

2.33 (.90)

2.26 (.90)

1.89 (.74)

2.33
(1.05)

2.09 (.90)

3.00 (.94)

2.40 (.91)

2.74 (.96)

2.84 (.83)

2.67 (.72)

2.76 (.78)

2.63 (1.07)

2.40 (.99)

2.53 (1.02)
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How confident are you that you could
ask a meaningful question that could be
answered experimentally?
How confident are you that you could
explain something that you learned in
this biology course to another person?
How confident are you that you could
use a scientific approach to solve a
problem at home?

2.37 (.76)

2.13 (.83)

2.26 (.79)

2.11 (.94)

1.93 (.80)

2.03 (.87)

2.37 (1.01)

2.00 (.76)

2.21 (.91)

